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The term neoliberalism became associated with processes of economic and social 
restructuring in various parts of the world during the latter years of the twentieth 
century.  While the importance of these processes is undisputed, the extent to 
which neoliberalism constitutes a coherent and consistent ideology, or merely a 
contingent and contextual set of broadly related policies, remains a source of 
contention.  In this article we will explore this question through a comparative 
analysis of the political discourse of neoliberal transition in Britain and 
Chile.  Drawing on the model of historical comparison developed by Antonio 
Gramsci, we will argue that these two countries represent paradigm cases of the 
constitutional and authoritarian routes to neoliberalism.  However, by focusing on 
the discourses of national renewal in the speeches and writings of Margaret 
Thatcher and Augusto Pinochet, we will argue that both cases rest on a particular 
articulation of the themes of coercion and consent.  As such, we will suggest that 
while each paradigm articulates these themes in distinct ways, it is the relationship 
between the two that is essential to the political ideology of neoliberalism, as the 
coercive construction of consensus in Chile and the consensual construction of 








In the final three decades of the twentieth century much of the world became 
engaged in processes of economic restructuring associated with the term 
neoliberalism.  There is no dispute about the social and political significance of 
these processes, however, there remains a good deal of dispute about the precise 
character of neoliberalism as an ideology.1  The term was first used by Alexander 
Rüstow in 1938 (with both Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises in 
attendance) as a response to the economic turmoil of the Depression.2  Quite 
clearly the word neoliberalism is suggestive of an inheritance drawn from the 
classical liberal tradition of the nineteenth century.  However, the renovation of this 
classical tradition is most closely associated with Hayek’s seminal text The Road to 
Serfdom.3   
 
In his text Hayek argues that the intervention of the state into economic affairs 
constitutes the first step along the path to totalitarianism, the submission of the 
individual to the collective, and the ultimate draining of the human spirit.4  The 
major political impetus for Hayek’s critique was to tie together the Keynesian liberal 
economic model associated with the New Deal in the United States and the post-
war consensus in much of western Europe, with the socialist economic model of 
state planning associated with the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw 
Pact.  As such the origins of neoliberalism can only be understood in the intellectual 
context of the Cold War, as a particularly combative assertion of the value of 
individual freedom against collectivist tyranny.5 While this critique remained almost 
entirely marginal during the 1950s and 1960s it did establish an important foothold 
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in the academic discipline of economics, most influentially at the University of 
Chicago.  Even as late as the early 1970s, however, the influence of the new liberal 
doctrine was largely confined to a few idiosyncratic politicians,6 libertarian 
academics and generous business donors.7  And yet, only twenty years later, this 
marginal doctrine had not only entered the mainstream, it had come to stand as an 
unquestionable economic philosophy of human nature, to which Margaret Thatcher 
would famously suggest, there is no alternative.8     
 
The economic application of the philosophical arguments developed by Hayek 
constituted a fairly coherent set of policies during the 1980s and 1990s: 
privatisation of nationalised industries, deregulation of financial markets, 
flexibilisation of labour markets, reductions to welfare budgets, elimination of state 
subsidies and a shift towards export-led growth.  These core economic policies 
would appear to suggest a broadly coherent free market ideology; however, the 
project of neoliberalism was never confined to merely economic reforms, but 
rather, implied a total social transformation.  In this context, scholars have 
analysed neoliberalism as a specific form of capitalism in crisis (Kotz),9 or as a class 
strategy for the upward redistribution of wealth (Duménil and Lévy).10 However, 
even beyond political economy, scholars have identified neoliberalism with a 
hollowing out of the political subject (Brown),11 a process which embeds violence 
systematically within its “civilising” mission (Springer).12  Sociologically, it has been 
seen as a form of punitive morality with regard to personal welfare (Wacquant)13 
and even sexual health.14  In this sense, neoliberalism can be thought of as an 
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ideology which brings together both traditional cultural values, and liberal principles 
of personal responsibility, identified by Eagleton-Pierce as individualism, the 
universality of global markets, and meliorism - the idea that 'individuals have the 
potential to improve and remake themselves.'15   
 
These studies have undoubtedly enriched our understanding of the meaning of 
neoliberalism, but they have also made it increasingly difficult to offer a precise 
definition of what neoliberalism is exactly.  This conceptual problem is compounded 
by the fact that the term neoliberalism has been applied to so many different 
countries and regions around the world.  It is applied to Wall Street during the era 
of Reaganomics in the United States in the 1980s,16 but also to the impoverished 
slums of Peru during the Fujimori regime in the 1990s;17 to the ‘open door’ policy 
instituted by the Communist Party of China from 1979,18 but also to the 
implementation of ‘shock doctrine’ reforms following the collapse of communism in 
Russia in 1991.19 If the same term can be applied to city-traders and slum-
dwellers, communist states and post-communist transitions, then surely it has lost 
any degree of conceptual precision, even assuming it had such precision in the first 
place.20  To understand neoliberalism, then, we need to acknowledge the 
complexity of the phenomenon, an assortment of social relations materialized 
through innumerable social, political, economic, cultural and geographical practices 




Indeed, in recent years there has developed something of a consensus amongst 
scholars seeking to understand neoliberalism, that the multiplicity of this ideology is 
inherent within its form: it is in a sense inherently contextual.  As Adam Tickell and 
Jamie Peck argue, we cannot speak of any universal form of neoliberalism, instead 
we should speak of neoliberalisation as ‘a contingently realised process, not … an 
end-state or “condition’’’, paying attention ‘both to its “local” mediations and 
institutional variants and to the “family resemblances” and causative connections 
that link these together.’ 22  We can say, then, that neoliberalism is inherently 
contextual; however, its particular articulations are always related.  In this article 
we will offer an interpretation of neoliberalism as a global historical project 
involving logics of coercion and consent in the transformation of subjectivities, 
focused on the political discourse of two paradigm cases of neoliberal transition, 
Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Augusto Pinochet in Chile.  However, we will also 
argue that the precise relationship of these logics of coercion and consent is distinct 
in the two cases – the consensual construction of coercion in Britain, and the 
coercive construction of consent in Chile. 
 
These two cases have been chosen because they stand as paradigms for two 
models of neoliberal transition, the constitutional model in Britain and the 
authoritarian model in Chile.  Quite clearly there are fundamental differences 
between the two countries.  In Britain the Conservative Party government of 
Margaret Thatcher came to power in Britain democratically following the general 
election victory of 1979. It would go on to win three subsequent general elections 
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in 1983, 1987 and 1992.23  In Chile, by contrast, the military regime headed by 
General Augusto Pinochet came to power through a coup d’état which involved the 
bombing of the presidential palace, the death of the democratically mandated 
president Salvador Allende, and the arrest, torture, disappearance and murder of 
many tens of thousands of political opponents.24 Whereas Thatcherism has been 
described as a ‘movement of intellectual reconstruction’, which sought ‘to articulate 
“retrenchment” through a full-blown ideology for national revival’,25  Chile’s process 
of neoliberalisation resulted in the brutal construction of a ‘dualist state’ which 
combined the logics of economic freedom with a violent authoritarian state.26  
 
This is, therefore, not a standard comparative study of two countries at a similar 
level of economic development with broadly comparable political institutional 
arrangements.27  It is, however, precisely the fundamental nature of the contextual 
differences between the two cases that will allow us to explore the structural 
parallels across the two paradigms.  In particular, in this article we will focuses on 
the discourse of national renewal in the speeches and writings of Thatcher and 
Pinochet.28  The selection of key public speeches follows Fairclough in focusing on 
the discursive nature of the transition to ‘new capitalism’, and on the construction 
of the consent of a national-popular base, on the basis of a ‘spurious and imaginary’ 
solidarity with ‘fictional “publics”’.29  Clearly these speeches only reflect a particular 
dimension of the ideological project; however, they will be analysed here as acts of 
what Hall calls ‘popular ventriloquism’,30 in which the speaker claims the right to 
articulate their own views as those of ‘the people’.31 In both cases, we identify a 
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discourse of ‘national renewal’ through rhetorical appeals for the restoration of a 
glorious past associated with a unified and harmonious national community.32   
 
In Britain, we will demonstrate how the discourse of Thatcher serves as the basis 
for what Stuart Hall33 suggests is the creation of popular consent for a politics of 
coercion against those social groups deemed to be sources of disruption and 
disorder.  In Chile, by contrast, we will demonstrate how the discourse of Pinochet 
begins from an explicit affirmation of the coercive elimination of those elements 
deemed to have disrupted the unity of the national community.34 We will then show 
how this served as the basis for a new national consensus based on the de-
politicisation of framing the economy as ostensibly beyond contentious 
politics – creating a ‘consumer’s paradise but a citizens’ wasteland’.35  In Britain, 
therefore, we will suggest neoliberal restructuring is achieved constitutionally as the 
consensual construction of coercion, while in Chile the neoliberal transition develops 
as a coercive imposition of consensus.  For the Chilean case, the analysis of the 
development of Pinochetism will necessarily cover only the decade following the 
seizure of power from 1973-1983,36 while the British context will cover the ten 
years that constitute the formation of Thatcherism, from her election as 
Conservative Party leader in 1975 through to the conclusion of the UK Miners’ 
Strike in 1985.  Before beginning this empirical analysis, however, we will first set 
out the theoretical framework by which we intend to conduct the analysis, drawing 





Coercion and consent in Antonio Gramsci’s historical comparative method 
 
In simple terms coercion and consent can be thought of as two distinct strategies 
by which people are compelled or convinced to undertake a particular course of 
action.  In its pure form coercion will involve a deployment (or threat) of physical 
force by one party in order to compel another party to undertake some action 
against their own will, while consent will involve some deployment of intellectual 
force by one party to convince another party that they themselves will the action to 
be undertaken.  In terms of politics, however, these pure forms of coercion and 
consent rarely if ever exist in isolation.  As Machiavelli argued in the fifteenth 
century, the prudent prince in times of instability ‘ought not to mind the reproach of 
cruelty’ on the basis that ‘it is better to be feared than loved’ (The Prince XVII).37  
However, if the prince aspires to a long and successful rule, he should seek to avoid 
excessive cruelty, which might lead to resentment amongst the populace, but will 
instead survive and prosper by building consent for his rule ‘by avoiding being 
hated and despised, and by keeping the people satisfied with him’ (The Prince 
XIX).38  Machiavelli offered a truly modern theory of politics, by moving beyond 
religious metaphysical claims of divine right, to a secular analysis of social power 
for thinking about the legitimisation of sovereignty. 
 
Several centuries later Karl Marx would further radicalise this analysis by seeking to 
understand the material relations of production that constitute earthly social forces.  
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As Machiavelli had demystified politics, Marx demystified political economy in terms 
of class struggle.  In the Marxian analysis, coercion and consent became 
dialectically connected, inter-related phenomena, as ‘The class which has the 
means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the 
means of mental production’.39  This relationship is noted by Antonio Gramsci in the 
development of a reading of Machiavelli through Marx40 as the basis for a 
materialist political science focused on ‘establishing the dialectical position of 
political activity as a particular level of the superstructure’.41  This dialectical 
understanding is crucial to Gramsci’s theory of politics. Indeed, as Perry Anderson42 
has demonstrated, all of the most important concepts in Gramsci’s thought are 
defined through dialectical relationships.  As such, when Gramsci analyses historical 
phenomena, he does not view them in isolation, but in their relationality to other 
phenomena across space and time.  Of particular importance here are the 
comparative historical studies of the French Revolution of 1789 and the Italian 
Risorgimento during the nineteenth century and Gramsci’s contemporary 
comparative reflections on the successful Russian Revolution of 1917 and the failed 
uprisings in Italy during 1919-1920.  
 
For Gramsci, as for Marx before him, the French Revolution stands as the paradigm 
of a ‘rapid and vigorous’43 process of social transformation, with the Jacobin party 
as the key actor.  For Gramsci, the major achievement of the Jacobin movement 
was to move beyond its own narrow social interests, to act as the representative of  
‘the revolutionary movement as a whole, as an integral historical development… of 
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all the national groups which had to be assimilated to the existing fundamental 
group’.44  In doing so, Gramsci concludes, the Jacobin party established itself in the 
leading role of the revolution ‘as the hegemonic group of all the popular forces’45 
building consent amongst the popular masses for a political project of the 
progressive bourgeoisie against the old aristocracy of the Ancien Regime.  The 
French Revolution is thus to be understood as a revolution of organic social forces, 
emerging from within French society.   
 
In Gramsci’s historical comparative method, therefore, the analysis of particular 
national processes is understood always in dialectical relationship to the 
international system.  As Adam Morton argues,46 this method of ‘historical analogy’ 
reflects a deep sensitivity to the uneven and combined nature of global 
development in Gramsci’s thought, based on a study of ‘variations in the actual 
processes whereby the same historical developments… manifests itself in different 
countries… not only (due) to the different combinations of internal relations… but 
also to the differing international relations’.47  As Morton suggests, Gramsci, 
therefore, sets himself the challenge ‘to elucidate some comparative principles of 
political science, in which the history of modern states can be situated both in 
terms of general trajectories and historical specificities’.48  The dialectical 
movement across historical time and geographical space is thus crucial to the 
dialectical understanding of the concepts, which can never be fixed, but must 
always be thought in process.  This can be seen even more clearly when 
Gramsci compares the successful Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia, 
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and the failed uprisings of the Biennio Rosso in Italy, from 1919 to 1920.  
The Bolsheviks had been able to capture power through a rapid ‘war of 
movement’,49 due to the fact that the Tsarist state had failed to undergo 
reform, and thus continued to rely on the coercive force of state 
repression; as Gramsci claims, ‘the state was everything (while) civil 
society was weak and gelatinous’50 This revolution inspired workers in 
Italy, however, here the reforms of the nineteenth century meant that the 
dominant social forces had achieved a large degree of consent within civil 
society, so that ‘the state was only an outer ditch, behind which there 
stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks’.51 In such 
circumstances, a ‘war of position’ could not be successful, but instead a 
‘war of movement’ would be required to create a level of revolutionary 
consciousness amongst the masses. 
 
Gramsci’s historical comparative method, therefore, allows us to understand the 
forms of coercion and consent as particular articulations of dialectically related 
social processes across time and space.  The Jacobin hegemonic project of 
transformative alliance with forces from below is compared and contrasted with the 
Moderate Party’s passive revolutionary project of a restorative alliance with forces 
from above.  However, both processes are understood in the context of the 
development of capitalism across Europe and the ascendancy of the European 
bourgeoisie.  By contrast, Gramsci analyses the coercive state repression of the 
rising bourgeoisie in nineteenth-century Russia as the basis for the success of 
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the Bolshevik ‘war of movement’, to be contrasted with the need for a ‘war of 
position’ in Western Europe, based on the building of consent amongst the popular 
forces in civil society. 
 
This opposition has not always been understood dialectically.  The ideas of consent, 
hegemony, civil society and ‘war of position’ have often been associated with a 
specifically ‘western Marxism’, while the ideas of coercion, passive revolution, state 
and ‘war of movement’ have been associated with the non-western developing 
world.  By the 1970s this meant that for many Marxists in Europe, while socialism 
could still be achieved through revolution in places like South Africa and Nicaragua, 
it could only be achieved through parliamentary processes in countries like France 
and Italy.  These ideas were particularly associated with the Eurocommunist 
movement,52 which explicitly referred to Gramsci as a primary source of inspiration.  
However, this is a non-dialectical Gramsci, the spatial and temporal movement is 
lacking, the conceptual relationships lost, and thus the categories become static 
and essentialised, the West is consensus, civil society, war of position, while the 
non-West is coercion, state, war of movement.  In this article, therefore, we seek 
to restore the dialectical character of Gramsci’s concepts, through a historical 
comparative approach which explores the development of neoliberalism in two very 
different contexts within the global economy.  In doing so we will demonstrate how 
both cases involve a complex articulation of the relationship between coercion and 
consent, which we will suggest is fundamental to the ascendancy of neoliberalism 
as a global ideology.  However, we also seek to suggest that the articulation of this 
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relationship is distinct in each case, reflecting the contextual differences into which 
this neoliberal ideology is inserted, as the coercive construction of consensus in 
Chile and the consensual construction of coercion in Britain. 
 
 
British constitutionalism and Chilean anti-constitutionalism in the 
discourse of national decline 
 
The processes of neoliberal transformation in Britain and Chile both developed out 
of periods of heightened social conflict and ideologically polarized politics.  While 
this arguably made both particularly prone to a more radical imposition of 
neoliberal ideology,53 each is distinct in its particular trajectory.  In Chile the period 
of socialist government between 1970 and 1973 had been marked by growing 
resistance from the middle class professional unions, including a long strike by 
truck drivers, small business, private media and in particular conservative sections 
of the military.  An attempted coup in June of 1973 had failed to dislodge the 
elected government, however in September of the same year, with significant 
encouragement and logistical support from the United States, the rebellious sectors 
of the military seized power.  The elected president Salvador Allende died during 
the bombing of the presidential palace, and in the days that followed many 
thousands of government supporters and leftist activists were rounded up, many 
were tortured and killed in the national stadium in Santiago, many thousands more 
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disappeared, the constitution was suspended and the country would be ruled by the 
military junta for the next 17 years.54 
 
In Britain, also, the 1970s had been a period of social conflict.  In 1974 the 
Conservative government of Edward Heath had lost power, amidst a strike by coal 
miners, in an election dominated by the issue of trade union power, characterised 
by Heath’s question to the electorate ‘Who runs Britain?’  The Labour government, 
which followed, was forced into negotiations with the IMF in 1976, leading to a 
string of austerity policies, most notably statutory constraints on pay and wages.  
Ultimately these policies led to the explosion of industrial struggles known as the 
Winter of Discontent in 1978.  The election of Margaret Thatcher the following year 
initiated a period of Conservative government, which would involve three 
subsequent electoral victories over 18 years.  The early discourse of the new 
governments reflects their divergent forms.  In Britain, prior to the 1979 election, 
Thatcher strikes a conciliatory tone, positioning the Conservatives as seeking to 
‘heal the wounds of a divided nation’.55  This tone is re-emphasised immediately 
after the election, in the famous allusion to St Francis of Assisi, in the promise to 
bring harmony where there has been discord.56  By contrast, the early 
pronouncements of the military regime in Chile are marked by a dictatorial and 
combative tone, with references to the ‘historical and responsible mission to fight 
for the liberation of the homeland from the Marxist yoke, and the restoration of 
order and institutions.’57  At this point, the discourse of the two regimes would 
appear to be fundamentally different, with Thatcher suggesting harmonious 
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consensus while Pinochet suggests violent coercion, yet as both discourses develop, 
we find a much more complex relationship.   
Thatcherism: Restoring national unity 
 
The early imagery of the healing of wounds and the bringing of harmony is not 
characteristic of Thatcher’s rhetorical style, yet it does reflect the central theme of 
the consensual discourse of Thatcherism, the restoration of the unity of the national 
community.  This discourse is apparent from Thatcher’s earliest speeches following 
her election as leader of the Conservative Party, in appeals to the true British 
national character, as constituted by a ‘positive, vital, driving, individual incentive’ 
which laid the grounds for ‘the achievements of Elizabethan England… Incentive 
that has been snuffed out by the Socialist State.’58  In this way the radicalism of 
neoliberal economics is articulated through a conservative ideological appeal to the 
restoration of continuity with a glorious national past. This is further established in 
the final Conference Speech prior to the 1979 election, in which Thatcher declares: 
 
Our ancestors built a land of pride and hope and confidence in the future, a 
land whose influence grew out of all proportion to her size, whose constitution 
guaranteed a balance between freedom and order, which used to be the 
British hallmark and became a model for the world. That was the heritage 




However, it is also clear from the beginning that the consensual rhetoric of 
restoring national unity will involve a degree of political conflict, in which the re-
establishment of the ‘authentic’ moral virtues of the British nation are set against 
the existent moral economies60 of the British people, distorted by three decades of 
socialism.  In a speech in 1977 to the Zurich Economic Society, Thatcher explicitly 
calls for a complete and radical ‘change in ideology ... in people’s beliefs and 
attitudes’,61 later describing this as ‘a wholly new attitude of mind’62 and even a re-
construction of economics in order to ‘change the heart(s) and soul(s)’ of the British 
people.63 The evocation of this glorious and unified national past is thus 
dramatically opposed to the many problems besetting socialist Britain during the 
1970s: ‘We all know them. They go to the root of the hopes and fears of ordinary 
people—high inflation, high unemployment, high taxation, appalling industrial 
relations, the lowest productivity in the Western world.’64 
 
Socialism is thus accused not only of leading to economic crisis, but more 
profoundly of corrupting the moral character of the nation,65 a corruption most 
strongly associated with a decline of constitutionality.  Here the primary target is 
clearly the trade union movement.  Only one year after Edward Heath’s ‘who runs 
Britain’ speech, Thatcher once again alludes to the idea ‘that Parliament, which 
ought to be in charge, is not in charge’.66  However, Thatcher goes further than 
Heath, extending this critique to include elected (Labour) politicians, at both local 
and national levels, accused of forfeiting their ultimate responsibility as guardians 
of the law: 
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The first people to uphold the law should be governments. It is tragic that the 
Socialist Government, to its lasting shame, should have lost its nerve and 
shed its principles over the People's Republic of Clay Cross.67 And that a group 
of the Labour Party should have tried to turn the Shrewsbury pickets into 
martyrs. On both occasions the law was broken. On one, violence was done.  
No decent society can live like that. No responsible party should condone it.68  
 
The allegation of anti-constitutionality even extends to schools under local authority 
control, which are identified as places of ‘political indoctrination’ and ‘propaganda’ 
against traditional British values, based on the corrupting influence of a ‘small 
minority which believes the principal purpose of education is to instil contempt for 
democratic institutions ... these destroyers would also destroy respect for our laws 
and the order on which a civilised society is based’.69  Thatcher’s rhetoric, 
therefore, establishes an opposition between the glorious and unified nation of the 
past and the politicised discord and division of the present, the authentic British 
national tradition of constitutionality, corrupted during a period of ‘socialist’ national 
decline.   
 
As Norman Fairclough suggests, this is part of a complex ‘authority/solidarity mix’70 
at the heart of Thatcherism, characterised by Stuart Hall71 as a combination of 
authoritarianism and populism.  We draw here on Hall’s observations that 
Thatcherism’s project required more than simply consent at the ballot box (which in 
fact wavered both before the Falklands War and after the Miners’ Strike, when 
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‘National Unity’ rhetoric rang hollow72). Rather, consent to this new social order is 
constructed across numerous terrains by deploying a consensual, non-antagonistic 
discourse designed to reduce complex economic, social and political antagonisms 
into a simple morality tale: the resurgence of the ‘British people’.  However, as 
Jessop et al emphasise,73 this appeal to national unity was always in part an 
antagonistic discourse, and, as we shall see below, serves as the basis for the 
legitimization of a coercive politics targeting those accused of sowing the politicised 
disunity that has led to national economic and moral decay.   
 
 
Pinochetism: reconstructing the Chilean political culture 
 
The rhetoric of the gradual decline of the national community in Thatcherism 
initially seems tepid when compared with the febrile language of the Chilean 
military junta.  The armed seizure of state power came amidst a period of intense 
social conflict, in which the rhetoric of existential national crisis had become 
normalised.  The claims of the military to save the country from Marxist chaos 
should thus be understood as part of a process that had developed through the 
final months of the Allende period, in various efforts to deem the elected Unidad 
Popular (UP)74 government as illegitimate, in particular the Congressional 
declaration of the government as unconstitutional in early September 1973.  This 
process of the de-legitimisation of the constitutionally elected government served 
as the basis for the legitimisation of the anti-constitutional military seizure of 
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power.  As a result, from the very beginning the discourse of Pinochetism sought to 
define the socialism of Unidad Popular as alien to the Chilean tradition, a ‘foreign 
ideology’ by which international powers (the Soviet Union, Cuba) were able to 
pursue their global ambitions in Chile.75  Socialists, Communists and Leftists could 
thus be represented as not only as political opponents, but as enemies of the 
nation, intent on dividing and ultimately subverting the national community. On this 
basis, enemies of the nation could be stripped of the legal or civil rights of 
citizenship and become subject to murder and disappearance, as the regime sought 
to establish a binary division of Chilean society between loyal, patriotic 
Pinochetistas and subversive Marxistas-Leninistas, sowing fear and conflict among 
co-workers, neighbours and friends.76  
 
  This binary division, however, served a much broader political project.  While the 
rhetoric of the new regime was focused on eliminating the ‘Marxist cancer and 
chaos’.77 it offered a narrative that extended well beyond the Unidad Popular, by 
associating the Allende period with a broader theme of partidismo, or what might 
be characterised as the politicisation of Chilean society.  Here we can see clear 
parallels with the discourse of Thatcherism, in particular in the hostility towards the 
trade unions and public services.  Pinochet acknowledges the legitimate role of 
trade unions as part of the national community, while emphasising the political 
linkages between trade unions and Marxists political parties as a major cause of 
national decline.  As Winn78 suggests, the organised working class are thus 
explicitly identified as the primary agent of the division of the national community, 
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to the extent that they pursue their own sectoral interests above the national 
interests, leading ultimately to the social conflict of the Allende period.  This can be 
seen when Pinochet reflects on the legitimate and illegitimate roles of trade 
unionism 
 
The purpose of strengthening the bargaining power of workers justified the 
idea of a compulsory trade union unity and militancy in the labour movement. 
Unfortunately, union objectives were used by infiltrators, political activists, 
which usually make up bureaucratized union oligarchies. The final aim was to 
exercise control over productive activities, service, etc., and consequentially, 
to control the economic progress of the nation, transforming this labour power 
into political influences.79  
 
The role that party politics played inside the trade union movement is also 
paralleled by the role played in state bureaucracies and public services.  In the 
early period following the Coup, Pinochet identifies this corruption with the system 
of pega or peguita (job post), by which positions in the bureaucracy would be 
allocated in accordance with party allegiances.  This system, as Pinochet represents 
it, reflects the division of the national community through the influence of 
partidismo, corrupting the country from top to bottom. For state bureaucrats, it is 
suggested, everything depended on the capacity of their party to gain power, in 
which case a good pega was assured.  Partidismo is thus associated with a political 
culture of corruption, by which each party group pursues its own interests rather 
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than the national interest.  On this view, the role played by party politics within the 
society led to the development of inefficiencies, sectarianism and ‘a lack of national 
doctrine’ within the public services.80  The Allende period is represented as the 
culmination of the destructive logics of party politics, which must be overcome, as 
Taylor has suggested, through the institutional transformation where society and 
state ‘would be forced to limit individual and collective action within the parameters 
set by rational marked forces'.81   
 
  The key to this discourse, therefore, is to construct the politicisation of society as 
‘paving the way for Marxist totalitarianism to come to power… in the service of a 
foreign imperialism that would abolish all forms of liberty in Chile, subverting 
personal safety and jeopardising national security’.82  The working class and the 
Left are thus marked out as the primary agents of social discord, to be physically 
liquidated, but it is clear that the entire constitutional system and political culture of 
the country are held responsible for allowing the crisis to happen.  This is confirmed 
in a speech from 1978 in which Pinochet reflects back on the Coup, ‘September 11 
did not mean only the overthrow of an illegitimate and failed government, but 
rather the overthrow of a completely depleted political and institutional system, and 
the consequent imperative to build a new one’.83  Pinochetism, as with Thatcherism, 
therefore, calls forth a unified and harmonious national community, in opposition to 
the existent culture of conflict in a politicised society, culminating in the ascendency 
of the socialist government during the Allende period.  However, it is clear that 
Pinochetism offers a much more radical break than Thatcherism, while Thatcher 
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aligns her project with the British tradition of constitutionality, against what she 
suggests is the anti-constitutional Left, Pinochet represents the Left as an inevitable 
result of the decadence of Chile’s constitutional political culture.  As such Pinochet 
is able to claim that if ‘Chile (is) to fulfil its great destiny’84 there must be a 
complete and necessarily violent break with the constitutional political culture.  As 
we will outline below, the violently coercive reorganisation of collectively public life 
would allow Pinochet to pursue a transformation of Chilean political culture along 
technocratic lines and in accordance with market forces. 
  
Constructing social war in Britain; imposing social peace in Chile 
 
Thatcherism: the enemy within 
 
The basis of the consensual discourse of Thatcherism described above can be 
summarised as an appeal for the restoration of a unified national community, based 
on traditional British values of individual incentive and constitutionality.  Yet as we 
have seen this restoration is acknowledged as being in antagonism with the 
existent moral economies of the British people.  The consensual rhetoric of unity 
and harmony, therefore, is always premised on the necessity for a coercive politics 
of division and conflict.  This latter strand finds expression in frequent references to 
historic battles, in particular the national struggle against totalitarianism during 
World War II.  Throughout her early speeches Thatcher associates herself with the 




You will understand, I know, the humility I feel at following in the footsteps of 
great men like our Leader … Winston Churchill, a man called by destiny who 
raised the name of Britain to supreme heights in the history of the free 
world.85  
 
Churchill is here evoked as leading a patriotic struggle ‘to raise the name of 
Britain to supreme heights’ but also an ideological struggle for the ‘free world’.  
In representing herself as following in the footsteps of Churchill, therefore, 
Thatcher seeks to position her own political project as transcending internal 
political divisions, as representative of the whole nation, a rhetorical theme 
which is elaborated in a conference speech the following year describing the 
Conservatives as: 
 
above all a patriotic party, a national party; and so it is not we who have been 
obsessed this week with how to take party advantage of the present crisis. 
What we have been concerned with is how we can tackle this crisis, how we 
can ensure the prosperity, the freedom – yes - and the honour of Britain. The 
very survival of our laws, our institutions, our national character - that is what 
is at stake today.86 
 
If Thatcher seeks to represent herself in continuity with Churchill as the 
embodiment of a patriotic struggle for the restoration of national unity, then 
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those to whom she is opposed are represented as agents of discord who have 
put ‘Britain...on its knees...(with) those old enough to remember the sacrifices of 
the war... now ask(ing) what ever happened to the fruits of victory’.87  Here 
there are clear parallels with the discourse of partidismo in Pinochetism, in the 
representation of the Conservatives as the party of the whole nation, in 
opposition to the Labour Party as the representative of the sectarian interests of 
the organised working class.   
 
As with Pinochet, this discourse represents socialism as an ideologically foreign 
subversion of the natural harmony of national community.  If the British national 
character is defined by individual freedom and constitutionality, the collectivism 
and politics of popular protest associated with socialism must be inherently ‘un-
British’.  On this basis, Thatcher declares: ‘I will go on criticising Socialism, and 
opposing Socialism … because it is bad for Britain—and Britain and Socialism are 
not the same thing.’88 As with Pinochetism, the domestic democratic socialism of 
the Labour Party is thus associated with the foreign, totalitarian Communism of 
the Soviet Union, which seeks ‘to destroy the free enterprise society and put a 
Marxist system in its place.’89 Thatcher makes this association even more 
explicitly in a speech to conference in 1976, when she claims that: 
 
The dividing line between the Labour Party programme and Communism is 
becoming harder and harder to detect.  Indeed, in many respects Labour's 
26 
 
programme is more extreme than those of many Communist parties of 
Western Europe.90 
 
The consensual discourse of a unified national community, therefore, serves to 
legitimise the exclusion of those deemed as agents of a foreign ideology opposed 
to traditional British values.  Thatcher thus appeals to ‘all those men and women 
of goodwill who do not want a Marxist future ... This is not just a fight about 
national solvency. It is a fight about the very foundations of the social order.’91 
 
The key agents in this context are once again the trade unions, who are cast as 
the enemies of the ‘British people’, because when workers go on strike, ‘it would 
be the people that would suffer. It always is.’  In such cases, it is ‘the duty of the 
Government, any Government … to act, through Parliament, on behalf of the 
nation as a whole’.92  As with Pinochetism, there is an effort to distinguish the 
party activists from the ordinary trade unionists ‘who go in fear of union power… 
the trade unionists themselves.  They want to escape from the rule of the 
militants’.93  Democratically-elected Trade Union leaders are thus represented as 
enemies of constitutional democracy, engaged in ‘a deliberate attack on our 
values, a deliberate attack on those who wish to promote merit and excellence, a 
deliberate attack on our heritage and great past’.94   
 
This violent and combative rhetoric culminates in the reference to the ‘enemy 
within’ during the 1984-5 Miners Strike, in which pickets are represented as anti-
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constitutional and anti-British: ‘out to destroy any properly elected government.  
They are out to bring down the framework of law’.95  As with Pinochet, though 
clearly not on the same scale, the representation of political opponents as 
ideologically foreign enemies of the nation allows the suspension of legal 
protections and the introduction of openly coercive measures, including an 
unprecedented resort to police violence, manipulation of the law courts and 
deployment of the intelligence agencies in order to crush the strike.96  The 
Miners’ Strike does not, however, mark a radical break in the discourse of 
Thatcherism, a turn away from consensus towards coercion.   Rather, as Ralph 
Miliband has argued, the presence of a ‘frenzied appeal’ to nationalism97 
associated with anti-communism and the restoration of law and order means 
coercion was always implicit in the consensual discourse of Thatcherism.98  There 
was no military coup in Britain, yet as Miliband suggests, the prospect of a state 
of emergency is implicit ‘in the name of democracy, freedom, law and order, the 
struggle against subversion and the defence of the Constitution.’99  The 
consensual rhetoric of national unity is, therefore, inseparable from a coercive 
project premised on a ‘single vertical cleavage’100 – a division in society between 
the “productive” (patriotic) and the “parasitic” (alien), which is part of an 
existential struggle for the soul of the nation.101   
 
 




As we have suggested above, the brute violence, which characterised the Chilean 
Coup and its aftermath constituted an unprecedented national trauma, involving 
the physical liquidation of the Left, but also a rejection of the country’s 
constitutional and democratic culture.  The formation of neoliberalism in Chile, 
therefore, involved the construction of a definitively new political culture 
[ostensibly] premised on scientific and technocratic aims.  This transformation 
involved a thorough project of the rationalisation of public administration designed 
to create a ‘modern and functional’ state purged of partidismo, so that efficiency 
and a renewed spirit of service … are its distinctive features’.102  Despite the radical 
violence, which characterised the Chilean transition, there is a consistent effort in 
the discourse of Pinochetism to legitimise the military intervention as part of an 
effort to restore the spirit of service and efficiency in the public services by 
separating the state from organised sectional interests in civil society.  In the new 
political culture, civil society will be the strict preserve of private interests mediated 
by the market, while the state will be run along meritocratic and patriotic lines, 
intervening ‘only in those areas or sectors of the economy that are strategic from 
the point of view of national security’.103 
 
As Thatcher had evoked traditional British values of incentive and deference, so 
also Pinochet paints his project of renovation in the colours of a traditional Chilean 
‘morality of merit and personal effort’.104  However, unlike Thatcher, as Pinochet 
rejects the constitutional tradition, his discourse is reliant on an authoritarian 
strand in the early Republic, represented by the figure of Diego Portales.  In 
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Pinochet’s construction, Diego Portales105 articulated an authentic Chilean national 
philosophy of Positivism in which national development is achieved through 
authoritarian leadership.  In this sense Pinochet represents his own project as 
inheriting the rationalist mantle of Chilean Positivism, by arguing that democracy 
cannot be successful until the adequate groundwork of law and order have been 
established.106  Drawing legitimacy from the image of the early Republic, Pinochet 
thus sets out a model of protected democracy, embedded in the Chilean national 
experience, whereby party politics is stripped of collective contestation and 
sectional interests, in favour of technocratic management directed towards national 
development, in which the legal order assures the primacy of individual rights, 
property and the rule of law.107   
 
Despite the fact that the Chilean Coup involved an anti-constitutional seizure of 
power and articulated a radically anti-democratic discourse, it is thus able to claim 
to be directed towards the establishment of constitutional democracy.  Pinochet 
thus constructs his own model of authoritarianism as a form of ‘soft dictatorship’ 
(dictablanda) in opposition to the ‘hard dictatorships’ (dicta-dura) associated with 
the arbitrary tyranny of Communism.108  While the Communist dictatorships involve 
a negation of the rights of the individual within the law, the Chilean military is 
concerned with the construction of law as the authoritative power in which true 
democracy could eventually develop through a culture of respect for individual 
‘liberty and the rule of law’.109  Through this discourse, the violent liquidation of 
Chilean constitutional democracy is represented as an effort to save it, from the 
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threat of sectarianism and demagoguery that had characterised Chilean political 
culture prior to September 11.110  The new political culture would, therefore, be 
premised on authoritarian leadership towards a de-politicised democracy that would 
subordinate all sectional interests before the primacy of the national interest.  The 
construction of consent within the project of Pinochetism thus involves three key 
pillars: 
 
1. To reincorporate the traditional values of the Chilean society 
2. To rebuild the nation based on the harmonious social and economic 
development 
3. To satisfy the spiritual concerns of human beings 
 
In defining this project, Pinochet argues that the new political culture should 
above all be focused on: 
 
strengthen(ing) the fundamental doctrine of the State of Chile, the core 
content of our Declaration of Principles that replace the classic, naive and 
defenceless liberal state, with a new one that is committed to freedom and 
human dignity and the essential values of nationality.111  
 
This model of a consensual, non-partisan protected democracy is of course, 
always premised on the potential, and actual, deployment of coercive force to 
suppress sectional interests opposed to national unity, on the basis that ‘any 
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attack against these principles, (is) contrary to the institutional order of the 
Republic. Freedom and democracy cannot survive if they do not defend 
themselves from those who seek to destroy them’.112  The elimination of 
opposition is, therefore, represented as part of a consensual discourse of the 
restoration of national unity and a protected return to democracy at the point 
where the nation has been sufficiently reorganised in accordance with 
technocratic governance and market forces. As Pinochet frames it, the aim of his 
project is to restore the harmony of the great Chilean family, which had been 
systematically disintegrated due to sectarian class interests that should not 
exist.113  Chilean society is thus to be re-defined, away from social and political 
conflict, towards the harmony of the national family, in which the state will act to 
protect all collective organisations from political influences: 
 
Given the relevance that the Government attaches to the organization of the 
community for social action, it will seek to promote, encourage and improve 
social organisation, introducing the legislative and other necessary measures 
to support it. At the same time, it will prevent the important contribution that 
these organizations can make to the process of local, regional and national 
development are frustrated by the work of politicization, which has no place in 
this type of activity, to which all citizens are called without distinctions.114 
 
The authoritarian project of Pinochetism is thus articulated through a consensual 
appeal to the traditional moral values of the family and the national community, 
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protected from the divisive influences of sectarian politics by a benevolent 
authoritarian state.  The brutal violence of the Coup which had murdered poets and 
musicians, tortured students and disappeared mothers and fathers is thus 
articulated through a consensual image of restoring the traditional national family.  
Once again, this should not be seen as a temporal break, an early period of 
coercive violence, which develops into a later period of consensual governance.  On 
the contrary, the physical liquidation of the Left and the elimination of the 
constitutional political culture had always been understood in terms of the 
restoration of the unity of the national community through the reorganisation of 




The cases of Britain and Chile clearly represent very distinct paths towards 
neoliberalism - a constitutional path in Britain marked by repeated electoral 
victories by the Conservative Party, and an authoritarian path in Chile marked by a 
brutal seizure of power by a military junta.  In this article, however, we have 
sought to suggest that both processes are marked by the dialectical relationship 
between coercion and consent.  In Britain, Thatcher offers a consensual discourse 
of the restoration of national unity, which implies a coercive project of repression of 
those who are accused of promoting division; this culminates in the rhetoric of the 
‘enemy within’ during the Miners Strike of 1984-5.  In Chile, Pinochet develops a 
coercive discourse directed at eliminating the ‘Marxist cancer’ of socialism, 
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however, this is also associated with a consensual project of reorganising Chilean 
society directed towards re-establishing the harmony of the national family.   
 
In applying Gramsci’s dialectical approach, therefore, we are able to move beyond 
the conventional understanding of these two processes of neoliberal transition, the 
one consensual and constitutional, the other coercive and authoritarian.  Instead, 
we have sought to demonstrate that in the discourse of both Thatcherism and 
Pinochetism, consent and coercion are inseparably linked.  In Britain, a consensus 
is created for coercive repression of the trade union movement, while in Chile, the 
coercive liquidation of the Left allows the forging of a non-partisan national 
consensus.  In both cases, this combination of coercion and consent is thus 
deployed to define the organised working class and its representatives as sectarian 
agents inspired by a foreign ideology in a conspiracy to subvert the national 
community.   
 
We can, therefore, speak of neoliberalism, in both its constitutional and 
authoritarian forms, as involving a combination of consent and coercion directed 
towards the reorganisation of society and ultimately the elimination of the 
organised working class as political agent.  The precise balance and articulation of 
coercion and consent, will define the particularity of the form of neoliberalisation, 
dependent on the precise contextual conditions within any particular country, its 
institutional framework, political culture and position in the global economy.  This 
is, however, an inherently contradictory project which over three decades, including 
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under Centre Left governments115, has embraced the rhetoric of conservative 
nationalism, even as its policies have championed global deregulation.  We might 
even argue that more recent political upheavals in the form of resurgent 
protectionist populism should be thought of not as an aberration, but rather as the 
culmination of the inherent contradictions in the ideological project of nationalist-
neoliberalism. 
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